Oct 20 2021

What Does the Performance Context Demand or Allow Redux

Sometimes the Performance Context allows a Referenced Performance Response – and sometimes it demands a Memorized Performance Response.

And the Performance Context and needs most often requires much more than the Knowledge & Skills of Individuals and Teams. It requires a Performance System of Processes and Enablers. More on that later.

In the news today…

Excerpts from AP News 2021-10-20

“Although the fire was started by an act of arson, the ship was lost due to an inability to extinguish the fire,” the report said, concluding that “repeated failures” by an “inadequately prepared crew” delivered “an ineffective fire response.”

FILE – In this July 12, 2020, file photo, smoke rises from the USS Bonhomme Richard at Naval Base San Diego in San Diego, after an explosion and fire on board the ship at Naval Base San Diego. A Navy report has concluded there were sweeping failures by commanders, crew members and others that fueled the July 2020 arson fire that destroyed the USS Bonhomme Richard, calling the massive five-day blaze in San Diego preventable and unacceptable. While one sailor has been charged with setting the fire, the more than 400-page report, obtained by The Associated Press, lists three dozen officers and sailors whose failings either directly led to the ship’s loss or contributed to it. (AP Photo/Denis Poroy, File)

It slammed commanders of the amphibious assault ship for poor oversight, and said the main firefighting foam system wasn’t used because it hadn’t been maintained properly and the crew didn’t know how to use it. The report is expected to be released Wednesday.

U.S. Navy officials on Tuesday said that while crews at sea consistently meet high firefighting standards, those skills drop off when ships move into maintenance periods. The Bonhomme Richard was undergoing maintenance at the time of the fire.

During maintenence there are more people and organizations involved with the ship, including contractors. And the repairs often involve equipment and chemicals that present different hazards and challenges.

The report describes a ship in disarray, with combustible materials scattered and stored improperly. It said maintenance reports were falsified, and that 87% of the fire stations on board had equipment problems or had not been inspected.

It also found that crew members didn’t ring the bells to alert sailors of a fire until 10 minutes after it was discovered. Those crucial minutes, the report said, caused delays in crews donning fire gear, assembling hose teams and responding to the fire.

Sailors also failed to push the button and activate the firefighting foam system, even though it was accessible and could have slowed the fire’s progress. “No member of the crew interviewed considered this action or had specific knowledge as to the location of the button or its function,” the report said.

Efforts to put out the fire were hampered because the ship’s crew and other outside fire response departments and organizations were not coordinated, couldn’t communicate effectively, hadn’t exercised together and weren’t well trained, the report said.

The report, written by Vice Adm. Scott Conn, included a number of recommended changes and improvements that have been endorsed by Lescher. The Navy set up a new fire safety assessment program that conducts random inspections, and has taken steps to increase training. Nearly 170 of those inspections have already been done, and officials said they are finding good results.

The Navy also conducted a historical study, looking closely at 15 shipyard fires over the last 12 years. It found recurring trends including failures to comply with fire prevention, detection and response policies.

***** ***** *****

To read the full AP New Report – please go here.

***** ***** *****

This 2020 shipboard fire reminded me of this 1967 shipboard fire – which I’ve written about – from my own personal experience – not with the fire on the USS Forrestal – but with my use of this video/film – on the USS Okinawa 1973-1975 – here in my 2017 Post:

L&D: Learning in the Workflow?

Not Always the Best Approach

I Mean to Be Dramatic with This Post.

USS FORRESTAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER FIRE TRIAL BY FIRE MOVIE 1967

From the YouTube Shownotes:

The US Navy uses the Forrestal fire and the lessons learned from it when teaching damage control and ammunition safety.

The flight deck film of the flight operations, entitled “Learn or Burn”, became mandatory viewing for firefighting trainees.

All new navy recruits are required to view a training video titled Trial by Fire: A Carrier Fights for Life, produced from footage of the fire and damage control efforts, both successful and unsuccessful. On the one hand there were damage control teams spraying fire fighting foam on the deck to contain the flames, which was the correct procedure, while on the other hand, crewmen on the other side of the deck sprayed seawater, washing away the foam and worsening the situation by washing burning fuel through the hole in the flight deck into the decks below. The burning fuel was not easily extinguished and was spread by water. Due to the first bomb blast, which killed nearly all of the specially trained firefighters on the ship, the remaining crew, who had no formal firefighting training, were forced to improvise.

In response, a “wash down” system, which floods the flight deck with foam or water, was incorporated into all carriers, with the first being installed aboard Franklin D. Roosevelt during her 1968-69 refit. Many other fire safety improvements also stemmed from this incident.

***** ***** *****

In the immortal words of Peter, Paul and Mary, in Where Have All the Flowers Gone:

“Oh, when will they ever learn? Oh, when will they ever learn?”

***** ***** *****

When Will They Ever Learn?

Can they/should they “Learn in the WorkFlow – or not?”

Instructional Analysts Really Need to Know: What does the Performance Context Demand or Allow?

So that their Instructional Analysis Appropriately Informs Instructional Design.

If the Performance Context… Demands a Memorized Performance Response… Then You will need to provide Training – and Spaced Learning if the Job Itself won’t provide Enough Reinforcements to keep the Knowledge and Skills Evergreen.

If the Performance Context… Allows for a Referenced Performance Response… Then You can provide Job Aids – with or without Training on How To Use that Performance Guidance.

A Short Video…

Another Short Video…

My Default is to Job Aids – and has been since 1979 when I first started in the business – as that’s what I was taught we would do. But our clients hated that so we simply embedded Job Aids into Training.

But sometimes Job Aids, Performance Support in the WorkFlow are totally inadequate – when there is not time for referencing them AND when they depend on a well honed skill and/or memorized foundational knowledge.

But Wait – There’s More!

Sometimes Knowledge and Skills are the only deficit. Sometimes it’s The Process Itself – and sometimes it is Other Enablers.

My framework for Analyzing that…